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IV

CASE

I.

A.

Nature of the Case.

Defendant/Respondent

Chamberlin,

D.O.

("Chamberlain")

Plaintiff/Appellant Thomas R. Taylor ("Taylor") statement
s statement
"Nature of

Case" subsection are

agrees

with

nature of the case.

treatment the Respondent's gave him set forth in his
allegations at

point and

not been

or determined.
Course
Taylor

his

January 24, 2011, Taylor filed a

court on
of Claim with the

Ida.~o

proceedings pursuant to I.C. § 6-1001 et. seq. R.

11. R. Vol. I, p. 31. On
Medicine, commencing
I, p. 31. The prelitigation panel

its advisory opinion on April 19,2011. R. Vol. I, pp. 31-32. On August 24,2011,
Chamberlain filed a motion to dismiss Taylor's claims

failure to timely serve the summons and

complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 4(a)(2). R. Vol. I, p. 49.
Taylor opposed Chamberlain's motion. R. Vol. I, p. 39, 105. Taylor also filed a CrossMotion to Stay Case Nunc Pro Tunc or Alternatively, to Enlarge Time to Serve Defendants under
LR.C.P. 6(b) contemporaneously with his opposition to Chamberlain's motion. R. Vol. I, p. 36.
The District Court denied Taylor's motion and dismissed his claims against Chamberlain in
an Opinion and Order entered on September 29, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 140. Based on the holding of
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Ruddv.

1

Court

that the case was not automatically

stayed pending a resolution of the prelitigation proceedings. R. VoL I, p. 137-38. With respect to
Taylor's motion to stay nunc pro tunc, the District Court held as follows:
Plaintiff s argument that this case is different from the Rudd case because no stay was
requested in Rudd also fails as the stay requested by Plaintiff was not requested until
after the
4(a)(2) six-month
had passed and EIRMC had filed its motion
to dismiss. It is clear
the case law that
six month period following the filing
of the complaint should be the focus
court's
fu"1d no stay was requested
during
VoL I,

1
respectto Taylor's

6(b) monon

contention that he had met the good cause

sta.lldard in Rule 4(a)(2), the District Court held the following:
Although the Court is not pursuaded that the actions of Plaintiff meet the less
stringent excusable neglect standard of Rule 6(b), that matter does not have to be
decided by this Court. A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or
criminal procedure, controls over a more general statute when there is any conflict
between the two or when the general statute is vague or ambiguous. Rule 4(a)(2) is
a specific rule that is to be applied strictly. Although Rule 6(b) and Rule 1 open the
door to grant relief for negligence to comply if deemed excusable, fostering Rule
1(ars favoring ofliberality and cases being decided on the merits, the more specific
and stringent restriction of Rule 4(a)(2) must override. This Court cannot allow the
Plaintiff to shift the good cause inquiry of Rule 4(a)(2) into a less stringent excusable
neglect inquiry simply by filing a motion to stay nunc pro tunc after the six-month
requirement has passed and EIRMC has filed a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the
good cause inquiry under Rule 4(a)(2) is the standard that must be met in this case
and the Court finds that the actions of Plaintiff do not meet that standard. Plaintiff
made absolutely no attempt to serve EIRMC or Chamberlain in the six months after
filing the Complaint. The argument that Plaintiff relied on a reasonable
interpretation ofldaho Code § 6-1006 is not supported by the statute's plain language
or its accompanying case law, both of which should have been readily accessible to
Plaintiff.
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R. VoL I, p. 139-40

1, the District Court entered a judgment dismissing Taylor's

On October 3,

Chamberlain without prejudice. R. Vol. 1, p. 144. Taylor
14, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 1

December 19, 2011,

judgment dismissing all defendants, including

against

his notice of appeal on November
District Court entered an amenclea

Jacobs, without

R. Vol. I, p. 151.

R. Vol. L p. 155.

Taylor filed an amended notice of appeal on January
C.

'v"""U.U.>

Statement

Taylor filed
on January 24,

I, p. 31, 50. The

2011. R. Vol. I, p. 7.

this matter on
] ],

filed an

UU'JU,"_(..I.U

for a

issued its decision on April 19, 2011.

"',,-'kCH.o'U

screening pa..'1el.

days
Vol.

Vol. I, p. 31-32,50. On August 5,

11, Taylor attempted to serve Chamberlain by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with
receptionist at his
to accept service on

office. R. Vol. I, p. 53. Chamberlain's receptionist was not authorized
behalf. Id. Chamberlain filed a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss

12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) for failure to effect service of process on August 24,2011. Taylor served
Chamberlain again September 5, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 119.

II.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did Taylor's failure to serve Chamberlain within the six-month time period required

by I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) constitute good cause or excusable neglect?
2.

Does a stay entered pursuant to I.C. § 6-1006 toll the six month time period for
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or process?
3.

Is Chamberlain "J..lL" ..... '-' to

<;;tTr,rn""J

fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to 1. C. § 12-

121 and 1.A.R. 40 and 4 ?
ARGUMENT
RULE4(a)(2) AND ITS

CORRECT IN
GOOD CAUSE STANDARD.
contends that the
U'"'''."'''''''

Court

when it failed to

contends that Rule

standard.

court applied, is the more specific

Rule 6(b) and its

not Rule

the district

Rule 1(a) favors a resolution on

merits whenever possible and to that end the Court

have

6(b)'s excusable

standard. Taylor's contentions are erroneous. The District Court was correct in applying
It is the more specific

1.

as a mandatory rule, Rule 1 can not alter compliance

is the Specific Rule and Should Be Applied in this Case.

"A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls over
a more general statute when there is any conflict between the two or when the general statute is
vague or ambiguous." Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842 (1993) (citations omitted).
The two rules at issue in this case are Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b). Rule 4(a)(2) states:
If a service of the SUJIlJIlons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within six
(6) months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such
service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within
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that period,
action shall be
as to
defendant without prejudice upon
the court's own initiative with 14 days
to such party or upon motion.
JHJlLO':',-,U

LR.C.P. 6(b) states:
\Vhen by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties, by VvTItten
stipulation, which does not disturb the orderly dispatch of business or the
convenience of the court, filed in the action,
or after the expiration
the
specified period, may enlarge the period, or
court for cause shown may at any
in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed
or as extended by previous order or
made after the PV''\'T,n,r,n
specified period permit
act to
where the failure to act was the result of
,",A\~U.:t'UUJ, negJect; but
time may not be extended
taking any
under rules
52(b), 59(b), (d), (e), and
to
extent and under the
stated
...

discussed general rules, specifically I.R.C.P. 60(b )(1), in Ausman v. State,

) is a general rule of civil procedure by wpjch a court, upon motion
such terms that are just, exercises its discretion to relieve a party of a judgment
for
mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect. It is not specific as
to what kinds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect must be shown
order
the moving party to be granted reliefby the court. Nor does the rule state
that it applies to any specific area civil law or to any specific types of judgments
or orders. This rule is simply a general rule of civil procedure, and whether or not a
court grants a motion under this rule is entirely discretionary. Johnston v. Pascoe,
100 Idlli~o 414, 420, 599 P.2d 985,991 (1979): Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho 709,
711,809 P.2d 1188,1190 (Ct.App.1991).

Ausman, 124 Idaho at 843.
I.R.C.P. 6(b) is analogous to LR.C.P. 60(b)(1). Like 60(b)(l), Rule 6(b) is a rule of civil
procedure by which a court, upon motion, exercises its discretion to grant a party additional time to
5 - RESPONDENT DA VID C~MBERLA~, D.O. 's BRIEF ON l~PPEAL

npf""trl,rr'r)

excusable neglect is shown. It does not state that it applies to

a procedural task

specific area of civil law or to any specific types of procedural tasks. Just like Rule 60(b)( 1),
is simply a general rule of civil procedure, and whether or not a court grfu'1ts a motion under this
rule is entirely discretionary.
In contrast, Rule

deals specifically and explicitly

failure to serve a complaint

the required six

UnJH"H

time period. It states precisely what a court must do if a party

effect service

UV.J,'-'UL

a

to

requested an extension of time
addresses
a showing
it is

specific

Court

defendants, wait
gain additional time to

2.

However,

Rule
an

b'-HJiV'U

of time

this case,

4(a)(2)
service of process -

Taylor's requested relief is specifically addressed in Rule 4(a)(2).
in this case.

Taylor's application
It

servlce

a court can
good cause.

is no discretion.

of show good cause.

6(b) to

to

effect service would eviscerate Rule

Taylor's reasoning, a plaintiff could file a complaint and, without serving
six month period expired and then simply file a Rule 6(b) motion to
service with just a showing of excusable neglect.

Rule 4(a)(2) is Mandatory and Therefore Rule 1(a) Can not Alter
Compliance.

Taylor contends that Rule 1(a) obligated the District Court to harmonize Rule 4(a)(2) and
Rule 6(b) in a vv'ay that promotes justice, fairness, and resolution on the merits. In support Taylor
notes that under Rule 1(a) the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
6 - RESPONTIENT DAVID CHAMBERLAIN, D.O.'s BRIEF ON l\PPEAL

inexpensive determination
language

every action and proceeding." Taylor goes on to quote the following

Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710 (1978):

The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to promote the
administration of justice. Those statutes and rules which fix the time within which
procedural rights are to be asserted are intended to expedite the disposition of causes
to the end that justice will not be denied by inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But,
except as to those which are mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations
should not be so applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of
causes upon their substantial merits
delay or prejudice.

Id at 711 (quoting Stoner v. Turner, 73
should not be

UULJU\..,U

so

to this principle. As
compliance

L!JLH~JLJ

added).

while

prevent causes from being decided on the merits,
Court explained

the

decision, Rule 1

is mandatory aIld jurisdictional." Id at 712.

Taylor goes to great L~U."'CLLJ to
or

117, 121 (1952»)

However,

convince this court that

4(a)(2) is not mandatory

clearly and explicitly decided that "Rule 4(a)(2) is

in mandatory language,

dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a

of good cause." Elliot v.

__ Idaho _ _ , 271 P.3d 678, 686 (2012) (quoting

Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,347 (1997)). "The purpose of Rule 4(a)(2) is to require
the plaintiff to promptly serve the defendant(s)." ld at 686.
Rule 4(a)(2) is also jurisdictional. "Service of process is the due process mechanism that
vests a court with jurisdiction over a person, with the power to require such person to comply with
the court's orders." McGloon v. Gyt.ynn, 140 Idaho 727,730, 100 P.3d 621, 624 (2004). Failure to
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serve a party

six months of filing

complaint constitutes improper service

deprives

the court of jurisdiction and renders any judgment unenforceable. "[W]here a party has not been
process or was improperly served with process, a..!1y judgment against such party is void."

served

Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 87 (1990) (citations omitted).
Thus,

to

mandatory and jurisdictional nature, Rule 1(a)' s directive to construe the
to comply

of Civil Procedure liberally can not alter or save Taylor from his
4(a)(2). As a

District Court was not

under

1

"to harmonize

Rule
4(a)(2)

"

and

TAYLOR DID NOT SHOW GOOD CAlJSE.

B.

district court proceedings Taylor contended that even if Rule 4(a)(2)'s good cause
was the applicable standard, his failure to serve
npn{),{l

was justified by good cause.

had more time to serve
on the

language

Idaho Code § 6-1

Chamberlain within Rule 4(a)(2)'s six
good cause amounts to the fact that he
this belief was reasonable because it was

" R. Vol. I, p. 111.

The District Court found that Taylor's argument that he relied on a reasonable interpretation
of 1. C. § 6-1006 was "not supported by the statute's plain language or its accompanying case law,
both of which should have been readily accessible to [Taylor]." R. Vol L p. 140. The District Court
also found that Taylor "made absolutely no attempt to serve ... Chamberlain in the six months after
filing the Complaint." R. Vol. I, p. 140. The District Court was correct in finding that Taylor did
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not show good cause for

to

serve

Chamberlain.

Rule 4(a)(2) imposes the burden of demonstrating good cause on the party who failed to
timely service. Sammis v. AIagnetek Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346 (1997). "Rule 4(a)(2) is
couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a
showing of good cause."

at 347. It has been abundantly clear for quite some time in this State

that Rule 4(a)(2) win be applied strictly. Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533 (2003). This court
held:
There is no bright-line test
determining whether good cause exists. Martin v.
Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372,375,987 P.2d 284,287 (l
"[W]hether legal excuse has
shown is a matter for judicial
based upon the facts and
circumstances in each case." id. The focus of the good cause inquiry is on the
six -month time period
the filing of the
"If a plaintiff fails to
make any attempt at service within the time period
rule, it is likely that a court
find no
of good cause." Jd. at 377,987 P.2d at 289; see also Campbell
v. Reagan, 144 Ida.l)o
159 P.3d 891, 894 (2007). Courts look to factors outside
of
including sudden illness,
catastrophe, or evasion of
service ofprocess.lv1artin, 133 Idaho at 377,987 P.2d at 289. Lack of prejudice is
irrelevant to the
at 375, 987
at 287.
Harrison v. Ed. of Profl

of the Idaho State Ed. of_Med., 145 Idaho 179, 183 (2008).

This Court has also determined that there are other facts that do not constitute good cause for
faili.Tlg to serve the summons and complaint with the six -month time period required by Rule 4(a)(2)
and are therefore irrelevant in determining good cause. The irrelevant factors include (1) time bar
if dismissed, (2) lack of prejudice to defendants, (3) defendant's knowledge of the pending litigation,
(4) pending proceedings before the prelitigation screening panel, and (5) timing of the motion to
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dismiss

271

v.

this case, the District Court

l.VUuu.

service on Dr. Chamberlain
vV1HV'U.UH.

at 687-88.

and it is undisputed, that Taylor failed to make any
six month time following the filing of the

Under Harrison, supra. this fact alone should prevent this Court from finding that Taylor

made a

of good cause,
s claimed excuse

§

not serving Dr. Chamberlain because

language and

he had more

to serve

reasonably relied upon
Chamberlain" amounts

had more

to a

[v.

was
1, p. 43. The Rudd

138

to serve Dr.

526 (2003)]case,"

as

P.2d 676 (1988), this Court held that a party
v. Bjornson., 115 Idaho 165,
allegedly harmed by medical
could commence a civil lawsuit before
screening paneL Idaho Code § 6-1001 does not
H'V'-'-LV~L malpractice lawsuit because it is filed before the
proceedings. Once the Plaintiffs filed
commencement of the
this lawsuit. however, Rule 4(a)(2) required that thev serve the summons and
complaint upon the Defendants within six months after the complaint was filed.

****
The Plaintiffs contend that Idaho Code §§ 6-1005 and 6-1006 tolled the running of
the six-month period within which the summons and complaint were required to be
served. Idaho Code § 6-1005 simply provides for the tolling of the statute of
limitations. There is nothing in the wording of the statute that could be
construed as tolling the running of tbe period within which the summons and
complaint must be sen"ed after a lawsuit is filed. There is likewise nothing in
Idaho Code § 6-1006 that tolls the running of tbe period within which the

10-
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summons and
must be served.
the statute authorizes the
court to stay civil proceedings until the
screening panel renders its
opinion, Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 765 P.2d 676 ( 988), the Plaintiffs in the
instant case did not seek any such stay.
at 530-31 (emphasis added); see also Elliot v. Verska, _ _ Idaho _ _ ,271 P.3d 678, 687
12).
fact "that he was unaware of the outlier Rudd case should not be

Taylor contends that
against

" R.

L
H"'V~~U

both
and in

43. However,
years after

§ 6-1005 and § 6-] 006 in the
Judicial Decisions

it not an outlier or archaic decision. It was
it is listed in the Notes and Decisions
and Michie versions of the Idaho Code
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

lack of awareness about the Rudd decision is even more egregious when one considers that
he was represented by two
This
neglect," Sammis, 130

firms and at least 3

attorneys.

held that "ignorance
at 347, and

goes

excusable

to be aware of the requirements or procedural

wles does not constitute excusable neglect." Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 393 (1990). Given
that Taylor's mistake of law does not even constitute excusable neglect, it cannot meet the higher
good cause standard. The District Court was therefore correct in determining that Taylor failed to
show good cause for failing to serve Chamberlain within the six month time period Rule 4(a)(2)
prescribes.
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TAYLOR HAS
Even

SHOWN EXCUSABLE l'I'EGLECT.
should have applied Rule 6(b)

Court were to conclude that the District

its accompanyLl1g excusable neglect standard, Taylor has not shown that his failure to timely
product of excusable neglect.

serve Dr. Chamberlain was

which would be expected of a

"The conduct constituting excusable neglect must be

same circumstances." LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158, 953

reasonably prudent person

seeking relief to

(1998).

951)

Co. v.
IS

respecting excusable neglect).
surrounding
1.

to bring themselves within

,71

Excusable Neglect.

failing to

has routinely held

the

at 280.

Taylor's Mistake of Lml' Does
reason

mle

of the facts presented

case must be examined in
same." Orange Transp.

As discussed above,
excuse. This

that under Rule 60(b), the burden

UU'~Hi'vUL """·':l"t~·ri

the party seeking to

excusable neglect. See

serve Dr. Chamberlain is a

HH.>U,u',,,

mistake of law or ignorance of procedural

requirements goes beyond excusable neglect. See Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347 (holding that
to be aware of the requirements or procedural rules does not constitute excusable neglect. "); Golay
v. Loomis, 118 Idaho at 387 ("failure to be aware of the requirements or procedural rules does not
constitute excusable neglect. ").
Taylor relies upon Schraufoagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753 eCt. App. 1987) and Stirm v.
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1

1046

where mistake

App.l

support

hJs contention that there may be instances

law can amount to excusable neglect. According to Taylor, if there was any case

in which a mistake oflaw may constitute excusable neglect, this is it because 1. e. § 6-1006 and Moss
strongly suggest that a stay oflitigation pending the resolution of preiitigation screening proceedings
is automatic.
s erroneous reading of
§ 6-1005 states that
ULlUU"U'JI,.

statute oflimitations

be

VeIHIU,"-

1006 and lvioss is not excusable under the
a prelitigation screening application is filed "the

and not be deemed to IlL'l during the time such a claim
days thereafter."

such a panel and for
uu,eVHIU"'y

§

provides only an

of the statute oflimitations and does not mention or require at! action by the district

court. Contrast this language with 1. e. § 6-1006,

courts baving jurisdiction of

such claims shall

conduct of such proceedings before the
suggests that a stay of

"the district court or other

states

proceedings in the interest of the

" The difference in the

proceedings is not automatic

the

LVLHllcc,"-

§ 6-1006 strongly
of the statute of limitations

in § 6-1005 but that the district court must take some affirmative action in order for the proceedings
to be stayed.
Taylor's contention that

~Moss

"strongly suggests" that a stay in proceedings is automatic

under I.e. § 6-1006 because }vioss does not mention a request for a stay anywhere is also without
merit. Wnile lvioss does not explicitly mention that a stay was requested, it is apparent from the
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stay was not automatic
"under I.C. § 6-1006,

requested.] First, the }vfoss Court stated

district court is vested with authority to stay civil proceedings until the
~Moss,

prelitigation screening panel renders its advisory opinion."

115 Idaho at 167. If a stay is

aU1Wrnm]C, there is no need to vest the district court v-ith authority to issue a stay_
court

that it '"[found] no error

proceedings

(emphasis

to

district

the

.

staving the

clearly suggests that a request
response to the motion to

Uch'HU.Ju

filed

In this case, at the very least, Taylor

~

the

the district court's decision to stay

court

the status of the DrCICe(~QlIlgS before it

proceedings.
stated clearly
construed as C~U~H'"
a lawsuit is

~'~"UU"Eo of the period

It also makes it

proceedings, the party must request such a stay.
Rudd was decided nearly fifteen years after Moss

there is nothing in I.e. § 6-1005 that could be
a SUITJilons and complaint must

sen'ed

order for the trial court to

civil

138 Idaho at 530-31.

noted above,

is not an outlier or archaic decision. This,

along with the fact that Taylor claims to have been unaware of Rudd despite being represented by
two law firms makes his conduct inexcusable.

] There is no statement
request a stay.

the decision indicating a party involved in the case did not
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2.

Diligently in his Efforts to Serve Chamberlain.

This Court has held that "if a plaintiff fails to make any attempt at service within the time
period of the rule, it is likely that a court \vill find no showing of good cause." Harrison, supra. 145
at 183. This Court has likewise held that negJect is not excusable if it is the product
or unreasonable

" See, Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 639 n.2 (2005)

a former """"lUI,~

73 Idaho at 121 (party asserting excusable neglect must

acted
not

It is

"IT,>rn,,,,

to serve

Chamberlain v.rithin the six

mAn.",

not act nrrYrYlnTI and diligently and his
servIce was

u.H!"~a.~IJH

subpoena and then waited
month deadline of July 20,

Taylor waited until July 12,
on or

11 to have the court issue a

August 5, 20 II-more than two weeks after the

11--to attempt service upon Dr. Chamberlain. Moreover, the

of the prelitigation screening panel were issued on

15,

LUlUHIES,;)

1. meaning that Taylor still waited

nearly three and a half months after the panel's findings were issued and two and half months after
a 30 day moratorium under I.C. § 6-1006 expired to attempt to serve Chamberlain. 2
Taylor failed to make any attempt of service on Chamberlain during the six month time
period for service under LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) and he did not act diligently. Further, this reason for his

It is important to note that Taylor's first service of process on Chamberlain was
improper and he waited approximately one more month to serve Chamberlain despite
Chamberlain filing his Motion to Dismiss under Rule 4(a)(2).
2
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to

excuse.

serve

therefore can not show

neglect.
DISTRICT
MOTION TO STAY
Taylor contends that

IS

no

NOT ERR IN DENYING TAYLOR'S

or case law that imposes a

to I.e. § 6-1006 should be

timing

a

§ 6-1

U,-''''UL.lLl''

for requesting
Taylor's

for the timing of a request for a

sets

It states:
(30) day
having jurisdiction
the conduct of such
§

party shall commence or prosecute
to the panel and
district or other courts
shall stay proceedings in
interest
the panel.

.. u.U.U.l"

vested

(emphasis

proceedings pursuant to I.e. § 6-1006 if it is
if it benefits the purpose of the

the

of the

to stay
proceedings, i.e.,

proceedings and paneL

The stated purpose of the pre-litigation panel is "to receive evidence concerning the
plaintiff s claim and at the close of the proceedings provide the parties its comments and
observations with respect to the dispute." James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 709 (1986). The express
legislative intent behind the pre-litigation statutes is "to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims
against physicians and hospitals." S.L. 1976, ch. 278, § 1. For this purpose, I.e. § 6-1005 tolls the
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~~"JU~'~~,,~

statute

H"AH'",al

malpractice

the pendency of a claim

before the pre-litigation panel to "encourag[ e] consideration of claims informally and without the

§ 6-1005.

necessity
Thus, a stay is

appropriate and authorized

resolution

claims against physicians and hospitals or

process.

30 day

6-1

it were to encourage the nonlitigation
aid

decision set forth in §§ 6-1005 and

the issuance of the

furthers

to review the potential claims

with guidance

to

a
moratorium

has been issued and

expired does not further

'-'l<CHHIJ

or proceed with litigation.

to
purpose

parameters of the

the 30 day

pre-litigation statutes. T11is is especially

true in this case where Taylor only seeks a stay nunc
resolve his

prelitigation screening

tunc not to provide an OPPOrtlLTJity to

L.... '''"U'-'H

process but instead to give

more

to proceed

litigation - the exact opposite of the pre-

litigation statute's stated purpose. Moreover. Taylor

motion to stay only after the time to

to serve the complaint and

serve under Rule 4(a)(2) had expired and Dr. Chamberlain had filed his motion to dismiss.
Further, allowing a stay to be entered nunc pro tunc after the panel issues its decision only
serves to prolong litigation and create uncertainty and confusion. Moreover, if a court were required
to grant a stay regardless of when it was requested, I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) would be nullified and rendered
meaningless.

plaintiff could wait to effect service until long after the six months set forth in
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could simply file

consequences.
a mCHlcon to stay nunc pro tunc under
Taylor's arQ'Ulllenl, the court would
Tay]or also contends that
'-UUH.:ni'-'U

"rrrHrYlpnT

a clearly established policy

However, Idaho

complaint. Plaintiff s

serve defend3-nts with the summons

would obviously

court's

is consistent with Idaho's

tunc at

a stay

of the pre-litigation statutes

E.

required to grant the motion.

goal of resolving cases on their

a plaintiff to

the six months expired, and, according to

§ 6-1

is to encourage resolution
IT'Ir,Y"'.,,

the

It is also ad odds

and is at odds

to

nunc

without

LHiiSU..'.VH.

tunc was

WOULD NOT TOLL THE TIME
A STAY PURSUA.i""T TO I.e. 6-1
PERIOD FOR SERVICE OF
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT.

Taylor contends that if a stay was requested and granted

1. C. S 6-1006 the stav would
v

.,

4(a)(2)'s service deadline. However, this Court has previously pointed out that
tolling of the statute of limitations.
Idaho Code § 6-1005 simply provides for
There is nothing in the wording of the statute
could be construed as tolling the
running of the period within which the summons and complaint must be served after
a lawsuit is filed. There is likewise nothing in Idaho Code §.6-1006 that tons the
running of the period within which the summons and complaint must be served.

Ruddv.•\1erritt, 138 Idaho 526,531 (2003) (emphasis added).
Thus, unlike I.e. § 6-1005, wherein the legislature explicitly provided for the tolling of the
statute of limitations, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature contemplated a tolling of the
time for serving a summons and complaint. Surely if the legislature intended to toll the time for
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HH.'.tU~"'-''''

service it could
language

an additional provision

specific tolling

I.e. § 1006. It did not.
a complaint prior to the completion of

This Court has ruled that a plaintiff can
proceedings before

prelitigation panel in
P.3d 678, 687

Idaho
However, it is not

that a

"because

statute
time

rnlf,nrH,

the statute oflimitations. Elliot v. Verska,

to

12 ) (quoting

v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho at 167).

a medical malpractice complaint prior to the

f-lH.lCUV.LU,

completion of proceedings before the panel

687

§ 6-1005 or

to

bar of the statute

limitations is tolled

for a

screernng
thereafter." Id. at

claim is pending

Convl'ay v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 146 (2005).

a stay

6-1006 would

only encourage plaintiff s to file complaints before the completion of prelitigation proceedings and
ignore the

and policy of Idaho Code §

005.

In addition, this Court "has never held

service of process cannot be accomplished while

a matter is pending before the pre litigation screening paneL" Elliot v. Verska, 271 P.3d at 687.
However, if a plaintiff chooses not to take advantage of the tolling provisions the legislature
provided in Idaho Code § 6-1005 and elects to file a complaint prior to completion of the
prelitigation proceedings "they [are] required by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
to serve the summons and complaint upon the Defendants within six months." Rudd, 138 Idaho at
533.
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a

can

to commence a

instead of using the tolling provisions in
requirement that service by
LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) were not
advantage of having

doing so comes with the additional

Code § 6-1

effectuated.
jJH..ua'CAH

is how it should be. If service purSUllilt to

would be

"",-rlD,rt

the additional and unintended

time for service under LR.C.P.

a complaint

to

to toll the statute of limitations

than use the

advlli'1tages

for it

§. 6-1005.
Requiring a
to

jJHOLHi'CLLL

to serve the summons and

SIX

vJJIHjJ'HHHC"

a
purpose of Rule

Verska, 271 P.3d at

mcmU1S if

is also
"to require

plaintiff to

,...,.',"",nth

serve

,",VL.hJhJC,","iC

defendant." Elliot v.

It is also consistent with this Court's rulings that "Rule 4(a)(2) is couched

mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a

does not comply, absent a showing of good

cause," Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho at 347, and that "the Rule will be applied strictly."

Rudd, 138 Idaho at 533.

light of the abundant case law and clear language of Rule 4(a)(2), Taylor

should not now be heard to complaint that it is unfair to require him to seek a stay or additional time
to effectuate service before the mandatory six-month time had expired.
Taylor contends that a stay should toll the time for service because it would be consistent
with the purpose of the pre-litigation statutes of encouraging nonlitigation resolutions of disputes.
However, the legislature explicitly set forth which provisions it deemed necessary to further the
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purpose of

Idaho Code § 6- 005 nor is it provided

included
H'J",",U.'''-

§

pre-litigation statutes

that "there is likewise nothing

time for service was not
in § 6-1006. See Rudel, 138 Idaho at 526

Idaho Code § 6-1006 that

the running of the period

which the summons and complaint must be served."). The legislattlre' s failure to do so when

it

have donse so is evidence that

.,,-,,au,,,,

the time for effecting service was not a provision the

deemed necessary to further the purpose

It seems more than a bit

statutes.

Taylor is now urging

he

of the prelitigation statutes
CU.l'~"'Hi.:o:,

LU'\..,I..U-"UL

scri~enmQ.

negligence

to expand the

betlam prior to

u.""UU,C)e

U!JIJLH.UCJVH

and

a complaint

for a prelitigation

panel.
CaAMBERLAI~

ENTITLED TO A TTO~~EY'S FEES AND COSTS O~

APPEAL.
Under 1. C. § 12-121 fees are to be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when the Court
IS

with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,

unreasonably or without foundation. Rudd, 138 Idaho at 533. In this instance, in light of the
unambiguous holdings in Rudd and Elliot and the clear language ofLR.C.P. 4(a)(2) and

case law

requiring strict application of the six month service deadline, Taylor's filing and pursuit of this
appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.

IV.

CONCLUSION

I.R.c.P. 4(a)(2) is couched in mandatory language and is the specific rule to be applied in this
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case.

it

not err

clear that Taylor's failure to timely serve

tunc.

it

motion was
not have been

was not due to good cause or justified by

,-"HULUUVL

was correct in dismissing Taylor"s claims

excusable neglect
Chamberlain. The

It is

accompanying good cause

Court was also correct
well

denying Taylor's request for a stay nunc

the six month

interest of the

~U""'U."'-JH

for service
proceedings.

the District Court' s U"'~L>1VH
August,

12.
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